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This paper explores the essence of the gadaa system (Oromo democracy) and how and 
why the Oromo people are struggling to preserve and develop this indigenous democracy, 
written records of which go back to the sixteenth century. It also explains the essence and 
the main characteristics of Oromo democracy that can be adapted to the current condition 
of Oromo society in order to revitalize the Oromo national movement for national self-
determination and democracy and to build a sovereign Oromia state in a multinational 
context. The paper also demonstrates that this kind of struggle is an uphill battle because 
the Oromo people are the colonial subjects of the Ethiopian state, and they do not have 
the freedom of association, organization, and expression. Furthermore, it asserts that this 
struggle is truly a difficult one in the twentieth first century as the process of 
globalization is intensified and regional and local cultures are being suppressed under the 
pressure of dominating cultures.  
 The Oromo people are the largest ethnonational group in Ethiopia today. They are 
estimated at 40 million of the 80 million people in Ethiopia alone. Although they are the 
largest population group, they are a political minority because they have been the colonial 
subjects of Ethiopia since the last decades of the nineteenth century. The Oromo do not 
have any genuine political representation; they have been ruled by the successive regimes 
of the Amhara-Tigray ethnonational groups that have been supported by Western powers 
(see Jalata, 2005a; Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990). Prior to their colonization, the Oromo 
people for many centuries were independent and organized both culturally and politically 
using the social institution of gadaa to maintain their security and sovereignty. The 
historical legacy of Oromo political leadership is the sovereignty of the Oromo people 
experienced under the gadaa government and an egalitarian framework. The design of 
gadaa as a social and political institution worked to prevent exploitation and political 
domination in Oromo society. Consequently, under the gadaa system Oromo society 
enjoyed relative peace, stability, sustainable prosperity, and political sovereignty despite 
low technological development. 
 Being assigned to the status of colonial subjects and second-class citizens by the 
Ethiopian state, the Oromo cultural and political resistance to Ethiopian colonization 
never halted. Various Oromo groups continued to challenge Ethiopian settler colonialism 
to regain their freedom and independence. There were numerous local uprisings in 
different parts of Oromia (the Oromo country). All of these forms of resistance took place 
without a central national organization. Scattered Oromo resistance movements continued 
until the 1960s, when all the struggles merged to form the Oromo national movement. 
The brutality and depredation of colonial rule did not crush the Oromo human spirit, 
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erase their cultural memory, or dampen their commitment to individual and collective 
resistance to colonial domination.  
A few elements of the Oromo educated class clearly understood the impact of 
Ethiopian colonialism on Oromo society by familiarizing themselves with Oromo history, 
culture, values, and various forms of the Oromo resistance to Ethiopian colonialism. 
These elements facilitated the emergence of the Oromo national movement by 
developing Oromummaa (Oromo culture, identity, and nationalism). The emergence of 
the Macca Tuulama Self-Help Association (MTSA) in the early 1960s and the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) in the early 1970s marked the development of Oromummaa and 
its national organizational structures. Since the 1980s, by replacing the main 
organization’s Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology Oromummaa has emerged as the central 
political ideology of the Oromo national movement led by the OLF. 
THE OROMO UNDER THE GADAA SYSTEM 
Recorded history demonstrates that between the sixteenth and the mid-seventieth 
centuries, all of the Oromo people lived under one gadaa administration (Baissa, 2004: 
101; Jalata, 2005: 20). In the gadaa republic, the Oromo people were organized around 
political, economic, social, cultural, and religious institutions. According to Lemmu 
Baissa (2004: 101),  
 
Gadaa government comprised a hierarchy of triple levels of government: the 
national, the regional and the local. At the pan-Oromo level, the national 
government was led by an elected luba council [leaders] formed from 
representatives of the major Oromo moieties, clan families and clans, under the 
presidency of the abba gadaa and his two deputies . . . The national leadership was 
responsible for such important matters as legislation and enforcement of general 
laws, handling issues of war and peace and coordinating the nation’s defense, 
management of intra-Oromo clan conflicts and dealing with non-Oromo people.  
 
 By the mid-seventeenth century, with an increased population and extended 
territorial possessions, different Oromo groups started to form autonomous gadaa 
governments (Baissa, 2004; Jalata, 2005a). While establishing autonomous local 
governments, the Oromo groups formed alliances, federations, and confederations to 
maintain their political and cultural solidarity and to defend their security and interest 
from their common enemies (Bulcha, 1996: 50; Etefa, 2008). The case of the Tuulama 
Oromo group demonstrates that “autonomous local governments were answerable to the 
overall gadaa of the main branch” (Etefa, 2008: 21). However, as some Oromo branches 
moved to far-flung regions and interacted with other peoples and as they settled and 
engaged in farming and trade, they developed class differentiation that gradually led to 
the transformation of the gadaa system into the moottii system (autocratic kingdom). 
 Constant wars led to the evolution of the abba dulas (military leaders) to 
hereditary moottiis (leaders) in northern and western Oromia. In other words, the 
emergence of class differentiation and the rise of the Oromo kingdoms suppressed the 
gadaa system in some parts of Oromia. During the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the Oromo people were ill equipped to unite and defend themselves effectively from the 
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Ethiopian colonial system mainly because of the decentralization of gadaa and the 
emergence of the moottii system. However, it was the Ethiopian colonial state that 
effectively suppressed the gadaa system in most parts of Oromia. Despite the internal 
challenge and the external attack on the gadaa system, the system has been the 
foundation and pillar of Oromo society with its principles remaining as the hallmark of 
the Oromo nation. 
THE ESSENCE AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF GADAA 
Gadaa has three interrelated meanings:  it is the grade during which a class of people 
assumes politico-ritual leadership, a period of eight years during which elected officials 
take power from the previous ones, and the institution of Oromo society (Legesse, 1973; 
2006). The gadaa system has the principles of checks and balances (such as periodic 
transfer of power every eight years and division of power among executive, legislative, 
and judiciary branches), balanced opposition (among five gadaa grades), and power 
sharing between higher and lower administrative organs to prevent power from falling 
into the hands of despots. Other principles of the system have included balanced 
representation of all clans, lineages, regions and confederacies, accountability of leaders, 
the settlement of disputes through reconciliation, and the respect for basic rights and 
liberties.  
 There are five gadaa grades; each has different names in different parts of Oromia 
as the result of the population expansion of the Oromo and their establishment of 
different autonomous administrative systems. For example, in central Oromia, these five 
grades are called itimakko, daballee, foollee, dorooma/qoondala, and luba. Oromo males 
are involuntarily recruited to both age-sets and generation-sets or gadaa grades. Male 
children join age-sets as newly born infants. Males born in the same eight-year period 
belong to an age-set. But they enter into the system of gadaa grades forty years after their 
fathers, and since one grade is eight years, fathers and sons are five grades apart. Male 
children can join advanced grades at birth, and may join men or old men who are 
considered to be members of their genealogical generations. Older men mentor young 
males in teaching rules and rituals, but the former treat the later as equals since there is no 
status difference between the two groups in a gadaa class (or grades).  
 Between the third and fourth gadaa grades, boys become adolescent and initiated 
into taking serious social responsibilities. The ruling group has responsibility to assign 
senior leaders and experts to instruct and council these young men in the importance of 
leadership, organization, and warfare. Young men are also trained to become junior 
warriors by taking part in war campaigns and hunting large animals; they learn the 
practical skills of warfare, military organization, and fighting so that they can engage in 
battle to defend their country and economic resources. As Paul T. Baxter (1978: 177) 
notes, the Oromo have used age-sets because generation-sets “cannot be an efficient 
means to mobilize troops, and a quite distinct organisation based on closeness of age . . . 
exists for that purpose.” 
 The rule of law is the key element of the gadaa system; those leaders who 
violated the law of the land or whose families could not maintain the required standard of 
the system were recalled before the end of their tenure in the office. Gadaa leaders 
implemented the laws that were made by representatives of the people; Oromo 
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democracy has allowed the Oromo people through their representatives to formulate 
change or amend laws and rules every eight years. The gadaa system accepted the 
Oromo people as the ultimate source of authority and believed nobody was above the rule 
of law. Gadaa officials were elected by established criteria by the people from the 
qoondala grade and received rigorous training in gadaa philosophy and governance for 
eight years before they entered the luba grade (administrative grade); the main criteria for 
election or selection to office included bravery, knowledge, honesty, demonstrated ability 
to govern, etc.  
 Today some aspects of gadaa still exist in some Oromo regions. In the Boorana 
Oromo community, for example, the Gumii Gaayyo (the assembly of multitudes) brings 
together almost  important leaders, such as living Abba Gadaas (the president of the 
assembly), the qaallus (spiritual leaders), age-set councilors, clan leaders and gadaa 
councilors, and other concerned individuals to make or amend or change laws and rules 
of every eight years. In August of 1996, the 37th Gumii Gaayyo Assembly was held to 
make, amend, or change three kinds of laws that the Boorana Oromo classifies as 
cardinal, customary, and supplementary laws (Huqqa, 1998). The Gumii Gaayyo 
assembly has a higher degree of ritual and political authority than the gadaa class and 
other assemblies because it “assembles representative of the entire society in conjunction 
with any individual who has the initiative to the ceremonial grounds,” and “what Gumii 
decides cannot be reversed by any other assembly” (Legesse, 1973: 93). However, under 
the Ethiopian colonial system, the surviving gadaa does not have the sovereignty it used 
to have.  
During the gadaa era, Oromo women had the siqqee institution, a parallel 
institution to the gadaa system that “functioned hand in hand with gadaa system as one of 
its built-in mechanisms of checks and balances” (Kumsa, 1997: 119). If the peace 
between men and women was broken, a siqqee rebellion was initiated to restore the law 
of God and the moral and ethical order of society. The gadaa and siqqee institutions 
greatly influenced the Oromo value system in pre-colonial (pre 1880s) Oromo society. 
These two institutions helped maintain saffu (Oromo moral codes) in Oromo society by 
enabling Oromo women to have control over resources and private spaces, social status 
and respect, sisterhood and solidarity by deterring men from infringing upon their 
individual and collective rights. Recognizing the importance of the gadaa system, Oromo 
nationalists are struggling to restore the system.   
THE STRUGGLE TO REVITILIZE GADAA   
Some core Oromo nationalists assert that without refining and adapting some elements of 
the original Oromo political culture of gadaa, the Oromo society cannot fully develop 
Oromummaa necessary to achieve national self-determination, statehood, and democratic 
governance. Recognizing that Oromo identity and peoplehood are an expression of 
Oromo culture, some Oromo nationalist scholars have started to study the cultural and 
religious foundations of Oromo society to understand the whole essence of Oromo 
society. Such scholars believe that studying, understanding, and restoring the original 
Oromo political institutions by refining and adapting them to contemporary conditions 
are practical steps towards unifying and consolidating the Oromo national movement. 
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These nationalists have already started to develop Oromummaa ideals based on original 
Oromo cultural foundations.  
 The Oromo national struggle has initiated the Oromo cultural movement initiated 
based on the following Oromo concepts: Oromummaa, gootummaa (bravery and 
patriotism), walabummaa (sovereignty), bilisummaa (liberation), gadaa (popular Oromo 
democracy), nagaa (peace), and kao or kaayyo (prosperity and peace). Furthermore, core 
Oromo nationalists assert today that all concerned Oromos should participate in 
revitalizing the Oromo national movement by applying some elements of gadaa, aiming 
at establishing a future Oromia state, sharing sovereignty with others,  implementing 
internal peace within the Oromo society, and promoting peace with Oromia’s neighbors. 
They also note that the Oromo national struggle has now reached at a level where it 
requires mass mobilization and participation in order to succeed. In this mobilization, 
they recommend the struggle to use the ideology and principles of gadaa democracy 
enshrined in Oromummaa to mobilize the entire nation spiritually, financially, militarily, 
and organizationally to take coordinated political and military actions.  
 Also, a few Oromo scholars suggest that Oromo political organizations need to 
use Oromo political wisdoms and experiences in order to reach the national 
organizational capacity and to throw off the chains of Ethiopian colonialism. They also 
recommend that after bringing together gadaa experts and Oromo intellectuals who are 
familiar with the Oromo democratic traditions, the Oromo national movement should 
start to formulate procedures, strategies, and tactics for building a national assembly with 
supreme authority called Gumii Oromia. At this national Gumii, they suggest 
representatives of all Oromo sectors, all serious and independent Oromo liberation fronts 
and organizations should carry out their national obligations. This national Gumii must be 
modeled after the Gumii Gaayyo: 
 
In Oromo democratic traditions, the highest authority does not reside in the great 
lawmakers who are celebrated by the people, nor the rulers who are elected to 
govern for eight years, nor hereditary rights, nor the age-sets and age-regiments 
who furnish the military force, nor the abba dula who lead their people in battle. It 
resides, instead, in the open national assembly, at which all gadaa councils and 
assemblies . . .  active and retired are represented, and warra Qallu, the electors, 
participate as observers. The meetings that take place every eight years review the 
conduct of the ruling gadaa council, punish any violators of law, and remove any 
or all of them from office, should that become necessary. In such sessions, a 
retired abba gadaa presides. The primary purpose of the meetings of the national 
assembly, however, is to reexamine the laws of the land, to reiterate them in 
public, to make new laws if necessary, and to settle disputes that were not 
resolved by lower levels in their judicial organizations (Legesse, 2006: 211)   
    
 The Gumii Gaayyo is an expression of the exemplar model of the unwritten 
Oromo constitution. Reframing and transforming the unwritten Oromo constitution into a 
new national constitution based on Oromo democratic principles require absolute 
commitment from Oromo nationalists and their organizations. As Asmarom Legesse 
(2006: 255) asserts, “Oromo democracy is not perfect: if it were, it would not be 
democratic. Like all democratic institutions, it is the product of changing human thought 
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that must always be re-examined in relation to changing historic circumstances.” The 
underlying assumption is that by establishing the National Assembly of Gumii Oromia, 
Oromo nationalists and organizations of the Oromo national movement aim to frame a 
written Oromo constitution by adapting older Oromo political traditions to new 
circumstances while also learning from other democratic practices. Those who promote 
the idea of building Gumii Oromia recommend that the Oromo national movement needs 
to address three major issues. The first issue is to further develop Oromummaa to its 
fullest capacity by overcoming its unevenness and deficiencies. This will strengthen the 
Oromo national organizational capacity.  
 Between the time when the Oromo were colonized and until Oromo nationalism 
emerged, Oromoness primarily existed on personal and the interpersonal levels since the 
Oromo were denied opportunities to form national institutions. Expressed Oromoness 
was targeted for destruction; colonial administrative regions established to suppress the 
Oromo people and exploit their resources. As a result, Oromo relational identities have 
been localized and not strongly connected to a collective Oromo national identity. The 
Oromo were forcibly separated from one another and prevented from exchanging goods 
and information with one another for more than a century. They were exposed to 
different cultures (i.e., languages, customs, values, etc.) and religions and adopted an 
array of them. Consequently, today there are Oromos who have internalized these 
externally imposed regional or religious identities because of their low level of political 
consciousness or from their political opportunism. The Oromo people who did not 
develop national political consciousness confuse clan, regional or religious politics with 
Oromo national politics.  
 Historically, Oromo political weaknesses mainly started to emerge as Oromos in 
some parts of Oromia moved away from belonging to one gadaa republic to forming 
autonomous gadaa governments. These weaknesses and the emergence of class 
stratification in western, central and northern Oromia resulted in the development of the 
moottii systems (kingdoms). Some of these leaders had collaborated with the 
Abyssinian/Ethiopian colonial system rather than defending the interest of the Oromo 
people during the second half of nineteenth century. Overcoming these political 
weaknesses by building Oromo national organizational capacity is only possible when 
Oromummaa as a national vision is accepted, energizes and unites the entire Oromo 
nation. As an element of culture, nationalism, and vision, national Oromummaa has the 
power to serve as a manifestation of the collective identity of the Oromo national 
movement.  
 The basis of national Oromummaa must be built on overarching principles that 
are embedded within Oromo traditions and culture and, at the same time, have universal 
relevance for all oppressed peoples. The main foundations of national Oromummaa are 
rooted in the rights of individual and collective freedom, justice, popular democracy, and 
human liberation, which are built on the concept of saffu (Oromo moral and ethical order) 
and are enshrined in gadaa principles. As the ideology of the Oromo national movement, 
national Oromummaa enables the Oromo to retrieve their cultural memories, assess the 
consequences of Ethiopian colonialism, and give voice to their collective grievances. 
National Oromummaa enables the Oromo people to form alliances with all political 
forces and social movements that accept the principles of national self-determination and 
multinational democracy in promotion of a global community that will be free from 
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oppression and exploitation. Therefore, Oromummaa is seen as a complex and dynamic 
national and global project.  
 As a national project and the central ideology of the Oromo national movement, 
Oromummaa enables the Oromo to mobilize diverse cultural resources, interlink Oromo 
personal, interpersonal and collective (national)  relationships, and assists in the 
development of Oromo-centric political strategies and tactics that can mobilize the nation 
for collective action empowering the people for liberation. As a global project, 
Oromummaa requires that the Oromo national movement be inclusive of all persons 
operating in a democratic fashion. This global Oromummaa enables the Oromo people to 
form alliances with all political forces and social movements that accept the principles of 
national self-determination and multinational democracy in promotion of a global 
humanity that will be free of all forms oppression and exploitation. In other words, global 
Oromummaa is based on the principles of mutual solidarity, social justice, and popular 
democracy.  
 The foundation of Oromummaa must be built on overarching principles that are 
embedded within Oromo traditions and culture and, at the same time, have universal 
relevance for all oppressed peoples. Although, in recent years, many Oromos have 
become adherents of Christianity and Islam, the concept of Waqaa (God) lies at the heart 
of Oromo traditions and culture. In Oromo traditions, Waqaa is the creator of the 
universe and the source of all life. The universe created by Waqaa contains within itself a 
sense of order and balance that is to be made manifest in human society. Although 
Oromummaa emerges from Oromo cultural and historical foundations, it goes beyond 
culture and history in providing a liberative narrative for the future of the Oromo nation 
as well as the future of other oppressed peoples, particularly those who suffer under the 
Ethiopian Empire. Those Oromos who endorse and glorify Ethiopianism and 
clan/regional politics are undermining Oromummaa in order to enjoy power and material 
benefits at the cost of the Oromo nation and other peoples.  
 Without recognizing the centrality of Oromummaa for the national struggle, the 
Oromo cannot develop a victorious consciousness that equips them with the knowledge 
of liberation. Oromummaa as an intellectual and ideological vision places the Oromo 
man and woman at the center of analysis and at the same time goes beyond Oromo 
society and aspires to develop global Oromummaa. Understanding Oromo society with 
its complex democratic laws, elaborate legislative traditions, and well-developed methods 
of dispute settlement, the Oromo national struggle can present a new perspective for 
African politics. The Oromo and other oppressed peoples can ally with one another on 
regional and global levels by exchanging political and cultural experiences and re-
creating the ideology of pan-Africanism from “below” and global mutual solidarity based 
on the principles of popular democracy and an egalitarian world order. Oromummaa 
challenges the idea of glorifying African monarchies, chiefs, or warlords that 
collaborated with European slavers and colonizers and destroyed Africa by participating 
in the slave trade and the project of colonization.  
 Those African(ist) scholars who degrade African democratic traditions just as 
their Euro-American counterparts devalue the Oromo democratic system and consider 
indigenous Africans such as Oromos primitive and “stateless.” Challenging the view of 
Euro-American racist and “modernist” scholars, Asmarom Legesse (2000: 30) asserts 
that  
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since monarchy was in decline in most Europe, and the transition to democracy 
became the epitome of Europe’s highest political aspirations, admitting that some 
varieties of democracy were firmly planted in Africa in the 16th century when in 
fact they were not fully established in Britain, the United States and France until 
the 17th or 18th century would have made the ideological premise of the ‘civilizing 
mission’ somewhat implausible. The idea … that African democracies may have 
some constitutional features that are more advanced than their European 
counterpart was and still is considered quite heretical. 
 
The second issue deals with the necessity of building a strong national movement 
that will lead to the formation of an independent Oromia sate that can share sovereignty 
with other peoples. As other nationalisms, Oromo nationalism has two edges, one cutting 
backward, and the other forward. The Oromo national movement should reconsider 
Oromo culture and history, and recognize its negative aspects and avoid them. As the 
formation of different autonomous gadaa governments and the emergence of the moottii 
system contributed to the defeat of the Oromo people in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the political fragmentation of Oromo society will perpetuate the defeat of the 
Oromo nation in the twenty first century. Without coordinating and consolidating the 
Oromo national movement, the Oromo cannot effectively confront and defeat the 
Ethiopian colonial system.  
The third issue is that while consolidating the Oromo national movement, it is 
necessary to build political alliances with other peoples who are interested in the 
principles of national self-determination and multinational democratic rule. Although the 
priority of the Oromo national movement is to liberate Oromia and its people, the 
movement has moral and political obligations to promote social justice and democracy 
for other peoples who have suffered under the successive authoritarian-terrorist 
governments of the Ethiopian Empire. Therefore, the Oromo movement needs to build a 
political alliance with national groups that endorse the principles of national self-
determination and multinational democracy. A democratic Oromia should play a central 
role in a multinational democratic state because of its democratic tradition, the size of its 
population, geopolitics, and abundant economic resources. The Oromo national 
movement should demonstrate to Oromo society and their neighbors that the Oromo 
nation is serious about statehood, sovereignty, and democracy for the Oromo as well as 
others. Let us now consider the regional and global challenges to the restoration of 
Oromo democracy. 
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES  
The gadaa system was mainly suppressed by the alliance of Ethiopian colonialism and 
global imperialism. Western powers, mainly Great Britain and the United States, have 
given external legitimacy to the Ethiopian state, which has been engaging in colonialism, 
state terrorism, and cultural destruction of indigenous peoples (Jalata, 2005a and 2005b). 
Successive Ethiopian regimes used Christianity to link themselves to Europe and North 
America to consolidate their powers against the colonized population groups, mainly the 
Oromo. In addition, between 1974 and 1991, the Mengistu regime utilized a “socialist” 
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discourse to ally itself with the former Soviet bloc and to consolidate its state power. 
Currently, the Meles government uses a “democratic” discourse to make its rule 
acceptable in the world and also to obtain financial and military assistance from the West 
while engaging in state terrorism (Jalata, 2005a: 229-252).  Since 1992, the Meles 
government has focused on attacking the Oromo national movement led by the OLF and 
transferring Oromia’s economic resources to Tigrayan elites and the Tigrayan region. The 
regime started its criminal actions by denying political space to the Oromo people when it 
“closed more than 200 OLF campaign offices and imprisoned and killed hundreds of 
OLF cadres and supporters ahead of the elections scheduled to take place on 21 June 
1992” (Hassen, 2002: 28). Furthermore, the regime focuses on developing Tigray and its 
human potential primarily at the cost Oromia and its population (Adunga, 2006). In 1992, 
the Meles regime claimed it was imprisoning 22,000 OLF members, supporters, and 
sympathizers in concentration camps at Didheesa in Wallaga, Agarfa in Bale, Blate in 
Sidamo, and Hurso in Hararge (Hassen, 2002, 32). Credible sources estimated that 
between 45,000 and 50,000 Oromos were imprisoned in these concentration camps from 
1992 to 1994 and 3000 of them died from torture, malnutrition, diarrhea, malaria, and 
other diseases (Pollack, 1996: 12).  
 This regime has banned independent Oromo organizations, including the OLF, 
and declared war on the Oromo people. It even outlawed Oromo journalists and other 
writers and closed down Oromo newspapers (Hassen, 2002: 31). The regime also banned 
Oromo musical groups and all professional associations. It primarily uses its puppet 
organization known as the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) to 
terrorize, suppress, and exploit the Oromo people. While terrorizing millions of Oromos, 
the Meles regime has established a political marriage of convenience with the 
governments of Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan, and some Somali warlords in order to deny 
support and sanctuary to Oromo refugees, the Oromo national movement and to extend 
its terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa. This terrorist regime maintains political 
repression, tight control of foreign aid and domestic financial resources, and direct 
ownership and control of all aspects of its militarized colonial state, including security 
and military institutions, and judiciary and other public bodies.  
 Emboldened by the external support it receives from the West, the current 
authoritarian-terrorist regime of Ethiopia is using terror to govern the colonized regions, 
such as Oromia, Ogadenia, Sidama, Gambella, as well as conducting recurrent wars on its 
neighbors, such as Eritrea and Somalia. The Meles regime also uses the media to attack 
the OLF and all self-aware Oromos in order to destroy any possibility of independent 
Oromo national leadership and to deny the formation of an Oromo political voice. It has 
targeted officials and members of the MTSA accusing them of being linked to the OLF 
and protesting Oromo students. Government security men closed the office of this 
association in Finfinnee, confiscated documents and properties, and imprisoned the 
chairperson, Diribi Demissie, vice-chairman, Gamachu Fayera, and other officers on May 
18, 2004. According to Human Rights Watch (2005b: 1-2):  
 
In July 2004, the Ethiopian government revoked the license of the venerable 
Oromo self-help association Macca Tuulama for allegedly carrying out ‘political 
activities’ in violations of its charter. The police subsequently arrested four of the 
organization’s leaders on charges of ‘terrorism’ and providing support to the OLF. 
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The four were released on bail in August but were arbitrarily arrested a week 
later. 
  
 Furthermore, governmental authorities consolidated quasi-government institutions 
known as gott and garee from a pre-existing system of local government to maintain tight 
political control in Oromia; they “imposed these new structures on . . . communities and 
the garee regularly require them to perform forced labor on projects they have no hand in 
designing. More disturbing, regional authorities are using the gott and garee to monitor 
the speech and personal lives of the rural population, to restrict and control the 
movements of residents, and to enforce farmers’ attendance at ‘meetings’ that are thinly 
disguised OPDO political rallies” (Human Rights Watch, 2005a: 2). The Meles 
government has continued to eliminate or imprison politically conscious and self-
respecting Oromos.  
 After being jailed and released from prison after six years, Seye Abraha, the 
former Defense Minister of the regime who participated in massacring and imprisoning 
thousands of Oromos, testified on January 5, 2008 to an audience in Virginia, U.S., that 
“esir betu Oromigna yinager” (“the prison speaks Afaan Oromoo [the Oromo language]”) 
and noted that “about 99% of the prisoners in Qaliti are Oromos.” According to Human 
Rights Watch (2005a: 1-2),  
 
Since 1992, security forces have imprisoned thousands of Oromo on charges of 
plotting armed insurrection on behalf of the OLF. Such accusations have regularly 
been used as a transparent pretext to imprison individuals who publicly question 
government policies or actions. Security forces have tortured many detainees and 
subjected them to continuing harassment and abuse for years after their release. 
That harassment, in turn has often destroyed victims’ ability to earn a livelihood 
and isolated them from their communities.” 
 
 Imprisoned Oromos and others are subjected to different forms of torture. Former 
prisoners testified that their arms and legs were tied tightly together on their backs while 
their naked bodies were whipped. There were prisoners who were locked up in empty 
steel barrels and tormented with heat from the tropical sun during the day and from the 
cold air at night. There were also prisoners who were forced into pits so that fire could be 
made on top of them (Fossati, Namarra and Niggli, 1996). State terrorism is employed to 
discourage the Oromo from participating in their national movement; such terrorism 
manifests itself in the form of war, assassination, murder, castration, burying alive, 
throwing off cliffs, hanging, torture, rape, poisoning, confiscation of properties by the 
police and the army, forcing people to submission by intimidation, beating, and 
disarming citizens.  
 The methods of killing also include burning, bombing, cutting throats or arteries 
in the neck, strangulation, shooting, and burying people up to their necks in the ground. 
State sanctioned rape is another form of terrorism used to demoralize, destroy, and to 
show that Tigrayans are a powerful group that can do any thing to the Oromo; Tigrayan 
cadres, soldiers, and officials have frequently raped Oromo girls and women ( Fossati, 
Namarra and Niggli, 1996: 10). Most Oromos who were murdered by the agents of the 
Ethiopian government were denied burial and eaten by hyenas. For instance, in 2007, the 
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Meles militia killed twenty Oromos and left their corpses on the Mountain of Suufi in 
Eastern Oromia. Furthermore, the regime has mobilized ethnonational minority groups 
such as the Somalis, Afars, Konsos, and Gumuz to kill and terrorize the Oromo. For 
instance, in the last week of May, the Gumuz militia terrorized the Oromo by murdering 
women, children and others in the administrative region of Wallaga (Voice of America, 
the Afaan Oromo Program, May 25, 26, 27, and 2008).  
 The regime has conducted fraudulent elections several times and has achieved 
recognition from the international community. Hence, the international community has 
ignored the principles of democracy and human rights. After the fraudulent May 2005 
elections, the Meles regime killed more than 193 demonstrators and imprisoned 
thousands of them in Finfinnee and other cities because they peacefully opposed the vote 
rigging carried out by the regime. Today nobody knows for sure how many people the 
regime killed or imprisoned in the rural areas since it did not allow the reporting of such 
information. Human Rights Watch (2005a: 1) notes that in “Oromia, the largest and most 
populous state in Ethiopia, systematic political repression and pervasive human rights 
violations have denied citizens the freedom to associate and to freely form and express 
their political ideas.” Against the backdrop of such incessant crimes against humanity, the 
only choice the Oromo people have is to intensify their national struggle in order to 
recreate Oromo statehood and sovereignty that they had once enjoyed under the gadaa 
republic.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Oromo national movement needs to refine and adapt some central aspects of the 
Oromo democratic heritage in order to facilitate a fundamental transformation in Oromo 
society. Retrieving the best elements of Oromo democratic traditions and establishing a 
politico-military organization are necessary to overcome the current political challenge 
the Oromo nation faces from the current Ethiopian government, its Oromo clienteles, and 
its global supporters which are all hindering the reemergence of Oromia statehood, 
sovereignty, and democracy. Refining and adapting the central elements of Oromo 
democratic traditions and developing national and global Oromummaa can help the 
Oromo nation to attain internal unity and peace and external solidarity with regional and 
international powers that recognize and accept the principles of national self-
determination, sustainable development, regional and global peace, and multinational 
democracy. The survival of the Oromo nation requires restoring the gadaa system, 
consolidating the Oromo national struggle, and mobilizing the entire Oromo nation to 
dismantle the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian terrorist government and to recreate a sovereign 
Oromia state that can be an integral part of a sovereign multinational democratic state in 
the Horn of Africa. 
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